The case findings are summarized in Table 5, which illustrates the main institutional logics found in the case police organizations, called ‘operational logic’ in Spain and ‘financial/NPM logic’ in Finland. Aspects of the typical institutional logics (suggested by earlier literature) were found in the cases, but we noted that the logics may include different emphases. For example, the administrative logic may be entangled with political decision-making in the public sector case organizations. This means that, especially in the process of selecting the KPIs, there can be multiple administrative and political decision-making interests involved in police work which can either support or oppose operational improvements. Administration was seen by police officers both as a good thing that unifies practices and as a menace causing bureaucracy and reducing operational time in the field. The Financial/NPM logic in decision-making in our cases seemed to involve either savings emphasis (e.g. saving money by reducing operative quality) or an emphasis on risk-based cost-effectiveness developments. Operational logic emphasis in police work seemed to mean that police officers in their duties are mostly concerned with service-level output issues and KPIs, such as work hours, or more widely with effectiveness issues and KPIs, such as the citizens’ perception of security.
The differences in the processes of KPI use in Spain and in Finland reflect the differences in the institutional logics. Cost-effectiveness may be pursued with different emphases, however, even within a certain institutional logic. For example, the risk analysis in Finland led to limited work force on Sundays for savings reasons but, because there were also few calls on Sundays in Finland, the average response time was not seriously affected. This suggests that the different institutional logics may be aligned and that even KPI ‘manipulation’ (e.g. with a focus on average, instead of always similar response time) is not necessarily a problematic response to institutional pressures (as seen by Oliver, 1991), because a well-selected KPI may still promote cost-effectiveness and oppose suboptimal behavior.
In Table 5, the effectiveness logic emphasis means a focus on the effects on the public, portrayed, for example, in the citizen perception of safety KPI in Spain. In the service-level emphasis, managerial focus is on the capacity to provide services and on such KPIs that portray, for example, the pre-emptive (or visibility related) operational service level, such as surveillance hours. In Finland there were some efficiency or success-related KPIs (e.g. the percentage of solved cases) in use, which, accompanied with the savings, indicate the prominence of financial/NPM logic emphasis among the Finnish police officers, particularly at the top management level.
Some case-specific differences may be attributed, however, to differences in the organization of the police. Spain has three police bodies: the National Police, the Civil Guard and the Local Police, an arrangement, which may lead to more administrative negotiations in the KPI selection phase. The Finnish Police is basically the one National Police with its local offices, which are independent of municipal politics. A simple organization structure may diminish administrative and co-operation problems.
Further, to summarize the multiple institutional logics found in the case organizations, we next present a detailed categorization, where we note that institutional logics may include subtle but still distinguishable emphases. Further, we note that administrative and political issues cannot always be separated in the public sector. The institutional logic categories found are: (1) financial/NPM logic, which, in our view can include emphasis on either ‘savings’ or ‘cost-effectiveness’; (2) operational logic, with emphasis on either ‘service level’ (e.g. working hour KPIs) or ‘effectiveness’ (e.g. the security perception); and (3) the administrative and political logic, which can include emphases that either ‘support’ or ‘suppress’ operative excellence.
Considering the different emphases, for example, administrative and political negotiations may support (enable) operations by providing effective human resources planning and resource prioritization. However, administrative and political negotiation practices may also suppress (constrain) operational efforts by imposing excessive bureaucracy (meetings, negotiations, etc.), which cloud the strategic focus of the organization (see Batac & Carassus, 2009; Olson et al., 2001; Tessier & Otley, 2012). In Finland, the financial logic sometimes overrides other issues and the focus of KPI use was often on savings. However, a cost-effectiveness emphasis with risk-based work hour planning reduced the negative effects of savings on the operative processes, and was even of strategic help for operations. In Spain, both the service-level output KPIs and effectiveness in terms of citizens’ perception of security were emphasized by different members of the police personnel. Further, reducing absenteeism served several organizational goals. In Spain, the effect of political negotiations in the KPI selection process seemed stronger than in Finland.
In the cases, ratio type KPIs or response times are basically comparative but there were national differences in the openness of reporting and in the definitions, such as defining ‘solving a case’, which allow some room for compromises and manipulation. More police officers work on surveillance operations in Spain, whereas in the sparsely populated areas of Finland it is not feasible to finance such activities. In Spain there are more mass events such as football games or concerts which are susceptible to traffic problems and to public unrest. In Finland these events may attract 5000 spectators, whereas in Spain there may be 75,000 spectators present. Further, there is more tourism and immigration in Spain, which require more police presence. These differences make KPIs difficult to compare and manage internationally.
